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THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AS AN EXCLUSIVE
OR ALTERNATIVE REMEDY
Edwin M. Borchard*
N a recent Michigan case' the seller of a boiler, claiming a chattel
mortgage therein for the unpaid purchase price, brought an action
against the person who had bought the boiler at a bankruptcy sale of
the property of the original buyer for a declaration that the plaintiff
had the right to possession, or in the alternative, that the defendant was
under a duty to pay the balance of the original purchase price. The
defendant claimed to be the owner free of the mortgage. A majority
of the Michigan Supreme Court, on its own motion, for the propriety
of the proceeding was not questioned by the parties, dismissed without
prejudice a judgment of the lower court in the plaintiff's favor on the
ground that "the proper action is replevin. The proceeding for declar-
atory judgment is not a substitute nor alternative for the common law
actions."
In so holding, the court has disregarded the terms of the Michigan
Declaratory judgment Act and an overwhelming practice in England
and the United States. The dissenting opinion of Judge Potter is as
sound as the dissenting opinion of Judge Sharpe in the Anway case of
1919 on the issue of the constitutionality of declaratory judgments, a
decision which the Michigan court, to their great credit, overruled in
1930.' It may be hoped that it will not take so many years to overrule
the present decision.
Before adducing the terms of the statute and the practice, it may be
observed that by the action for a declaration of his right to possession
the plaintiff was placing in issue the only vital point in controversy,
namely, whether his chattel mortgage was valid or not. A decision on
that point was decisive of the case, as he evidently did not want the
boiler. The court, though competent to decide the case by declaration,
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I Miller v. Siden, 259 Mich. 19, 242 N. W. 823 (932).
2 Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry. Co., zii Mich. 592, 179 N. W. 350 (1920).
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more explicit statute.
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THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
a simple form perfectly adapted to the purpose, forced the plaintiff to
commence all over again, and to adopt a form of proceeding expensive
and cumbersome, in order to achieve the identical goal originally
sought. This seems improper as a matter of law and unwise as a matter
of judicial policy.
As a matter of law, the statute of Michigan and the parallel stat-
utes in the United States and elsewhere make it abundantly clear that
the action for a declaratory judgment is not, and was never intended
to be, an exclusive or extraordinary remedy, available only on evidence
that no existing remedy sufficed. On the contrary, in accordance with
the express terms of the statute and in accordance with an almost uni-
form practice of decades, it is the simplicity of declaratory relief which
has commended it as a remedy to be employed whenever an uncompli-
cated issue is presented and when the determination of that issue would
settle the controversy. This form of relief was ideally suited to the
purpose of the Miller case.5
Let us examine the Michigan statute. Section i states that "no
action or proceeding in any court of record shall be open to objection
on the ground that a merely declaratory judgment, decree or order is
sought thereby." (Italics mine.) That is to say, even though an action
for replevin or for damages or what not might have been possible,
the action is not to be open to objection because it was brought for a
declaration of rights. The words quoted were designed to prevent
exactly what the Michigan court has just done. The section goes on to
say, "And the court may, in cases of actual controversy, make binding
declarations of rights whether any consequential relief is or could be
claimed, or not." (Italics mine.) That is, although the plaintiff
"could" have sought more coercive relief in the form of specific
performance, replevin, damages, etc., the fact that he chose to confine
"Mich. Pub. Acts 1929, No. 36, p. 68, Mich. Comp. Laws 1929, secs. 13903-9.
See Royal Bank of Canada v. Coughlan, 28 Br. Col. Rep. 247 (920) (where a
practically identical issue was determined by declaration); Greene v. Riordan, 97 Cal.
App. 462, 276 Pac. 141 (929) (plaintiff claims declaration that his written instru-
ment was a mortgage and not a deed); Brownell v. Board of Education of Saratoga
Springs, 239 N. Y. 369, 146 N. E. 630 (1925) (plaintiff, vendee of a building
burned before delivery, claims lien on insurance money paid to vendor); Albutt v. Con-
tinental Guaranty Corp. of Canada, 41 Br. Col. 537 (1929); National Discount Corp.
v. French, 2 D. L. R. 256 (Ont. 1928) (chattel mortgagee v. purchaser at sale). Gra-
ham v. Hamill, 35 Manit. Rep. 510 (1926) (plaintiff claims an equitable mortgage on
defendant's home); Wallace v. Fogarty, [1926] Ir. R. 255 (1925) (that a certain
mortgage on defendant's land was valid); Smith v. Cunningham, 34 N. Z. 385 (i915)
(validity of plaintiff's as against defendant's mortgage on X's land).
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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
his demanded relief to a declaration of his rights is not to bar his ac-
tion.
Like the rest of the section, these clauses find their source in Eng-
lish legal history. In the Chancery Procedure Act, I852, the courts
were given power to make declarations of right "without granting con-
sequential relief." This was interpreted by the Court of Chancery to •
mean'that a declaration could be made only in a case where the plain-
tiff, though having a right to consequential relief, chose not to ask for
it.8 Even this narrow construction the Michigan court repudiates. But
to indicate that the English people considered the construction unneces-
sarily narrow, the English Supreme Court Rules of 1883, OrderXXV,
Rule 5, from which the Michigan Act was taken, provide that the
Supreme Court shall have power to make binding declarations of right
"whether any consequential relief is or could be claimed or not." '
That is, whether the parties could or could not have sought coercive
relief is immaterial to the propriety of a declaration. No English court
has ever suggested that the mere possibility of obtaining a coercive
remedy is in principle a bar to an action for a declaration.
Section 2 of the Michigan Act provides that "declarations of rights
and determinations of questions of construction, as herein provided for,
may be obtained by means of ordinary proceedings at law or in equity,
or by means of a petition on either the law or equity side of the court as
the nature of-the case may require." There is nothing here to indicate
that the legislature considered the action for a declaration an extra-
ordinary proceeding, to be disallowed in cases where the facts might
have sustained a more drastic form of relief. On the contrary, the
declaration is distinctly contemplated as an alternative remedy, the
choice of which, as against other remedies, is left to the plaintiff, and
the declaration will be issued provided on the merits he is entitled to
the relief demanded and provided that the court concludes that the de-
termination will settle the controversy.'
This is made even clearer by the concluding words of section 2,
' Rooke v. Lord Kensington, z K. & J. (Ch.) 753, 69 Eng. Repr.'986 (1856).
7 Italics supplied. The New York Civil Practice Act, sec. 473 (1920) confers
power on the supreme court "in any action or proceeding to declare riglits and other
legal relations . . . whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." (Italics sup-
plied.)
' Sec. 6 of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act provides: "The court may
refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or
decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy
giving rise to the proceeding."
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reading, "and where a declaration of rights is the only relief asked, the
case may be noticed for early hearing as in the case of a motion." This
indicates that the draftsman of the statute was aware of the fact that
coercive relief as well as declaratory relief might be asked, alone or in
combination. But when the plaintiff chooses to confine his demand to
declaratory relief only, he has the advantage of an early hearing. This
is an inducement to the submission of cases by actions for a declaration.
As opposed to replevin, it determines the issue of title without the
necessity for a bond, attachment, sheriff's fees, warehousing, and insur-
ance, not to speak of other inconveniences and procedural pitfalls.'
Section'3 of the Michigan Act provides:
"Where further relief based upon a declaration of rights shall
become necessary or proper after such declaration has been made,
application may be made by motion to any court having jurisdic-
tion to grant such relief, for an order directed to any party or par-
ties whose rights have been determined by such declaration to
show cause why such further relief should not be granted forth-
with, upon such reasonable notice as shall be prescribed by the
court in the said order."
This would make it clear that a declaration may be sought and granted,
even though further coercive relief might be or might have been
possible. It assumes that declarations of rights alone might be and
would be sought. It was assumed, on the basis of long experience, that,
when a declaration of rights had settled the legal issue between the par-
ties - in this case the question of title and the validity of the chattel
mortgage - it would hardly be necessary for the sheriff to be invoked
to enforce the judgment by coercion. It rarely has proved necessary.
But if a losing party should have the temerity and recklessness to defy
the court's declaratory judgment, which irrevocably fixes the rights of
the parties, the winning party and the court are not helpless, but on
motion, in which the declaratory judgment is res judicata, an order
may issue carrying the judgment into coercive execution. The very
terms of the section indicate that the declaration may and is usually ex-
pected to stand alone.
If further evidence of the error of the Michigan court were needed,
it would be afforded by the fact that it is not uncommon practice to
combine in one action the request for a declaration and for some coer-
9 Cf. McFadden v. Lick Pier Co., Ioi Cal. App. 12, 28i Pac. 429 (1929);
Bentz v. Barclay, 294 Pa. 3oo, 144 Ad. 280 (1928); 45 H~Av. L. REv. 830 (1932).
No. 2
MICHIGAN LAw REviEw Vol. 31
cive relief," or to pray for declaratory relief in the alternative." If
there were any inconsistency between the two forms of relief, or if one
excluded the other, as the Michigan court seems to assume, they could
hardly be applied for in one and the same prayer for relief. The ad-
vantage of the combined request is that, while the coercive relief, such
as injunction, may be denied, the declaration of rights may be granted
- and the declaration of rights is the vital element in the plaintiff's
relief."2
It will be observed, moreover, that section 7 of the Michigan Act
provides that the "act is declared to be remedial, and is to be liberally
construed and liberally administered with a view of making the courts
more serviceable to the. people." This section does not seem to have
impressed the Michigan court, though the dissenting judge refers to it.
A few American decisions can be found in which the courts, in a
particular case, have held that the possibility of a coercive remedy
barred declaratory relief. This was because in those particular cases
the courts believed in their discretion that the declaratory relief would
not settle the issue or was, for some other substantial reason, inappro-
priate. 8 But neither American nor English courts have adopted the
'o Green v. Riordan, 97 Cal. App. 462, 276 Pac. 141 (i929) (declaration and
money judgment sought- relief confined to determination of the nature of the writ-
ten instrument and quieting of title); Brownell v. Board of Education of Saratoga
Springs, 239 N..Y. 369, 146 N. E. 630 (1925), rev'g 211 App. Div. 823, 206 N. Y.
S. 887 (1924) (specific performance and conveyance of title refused - declaration of
legal relations granted); Butterick Pub. Co. v. Fulton & Elm Leasing Co., 132 Mis.
366, 229 N. Y. S. 86 (1928) (claim for damages refused and declaration of right to
sub-let given); Beury v. Shelton, 151 Va. 28, 144 S. E. 629 (1928) (proceeding begun
under attachment statute but continued under declaratory judgment provision); Lon-
don Ass'n of Shipowners v. London & India Docks, L. R. [1892] 3 Ch. Div. 242;
Attorney General v. Merthyr Tydfil Union, L. R. [9oo] i Ch. Div. 516; Islington
Vestry v. Hornsey U. C., L. R. [19oo] i Ch. Div. 695; Grainger v. Order of Can-
adian Home Circles, 31 Ont. L. Rep. 461 (1914).
American courts have held that the parties must plead facts necessary to entitle
them to further relief. City of San Diego v. Cuyamaca Water Co., 209 Cal. 105 at
151, 287 Pac. 475 at 496 (1930); Village of Grosse Pointe Shores v. Ayres, 254 Mich.
58, 235 N. W. 829 (1931); Bartlett v. Lily" Dale Assembly, 139 Mis. 338 at 339,
249 N. Y. S. 482 at 483 (1931).
"See Fess Oil Burners, Ltd. v. Mutual Investments, Ltd., [193 Z] 2 D. L. R.
16, an action to recover damages for conversion and wrongful detention of an oil burner
or in the alternative a declaration that plaintiff was entitled to remove it.
12 See cases supra, note 10.
18 See Village of Grosse Pointe Shores v. Ayres, 254 Mich. 58, 235 N. W. 829
(I93i)0; Loesch v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. of New York, 128 Mis. 232, 218 N. Y. S.
412 (1926), 36 YALE L. J. 403 (19727); City of Williamsport v. Williamsport Water
Co., 300 Pa. 439, 15o Atl. 652 (1930); 40 YALe L. J. 129 (1930), and a few
THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
unsustainable position that, as a matter of principle, parties must seek
coercive relief whenever possible and may be denied declaratory relief
in cases where they might have sought coercive relief. That would run
counter to a uniform practice, and misinterpret the statutes.
Addressing itself to this very point, the Supreme Court of Virginia,
in a recent case, remarked:"'
"The test of the applicability of the statute is the determina-
tion of the existence of an actual controversy. The manifest inten-
tion of the legislature, as expressed in sections 614oa-614oh of
the Code, was to provide for a speedy determination of actual con-
troversies between citizens, and to prune, as far as is consonant
with right and justice, the dead wood attached to the common-law
rule of 'injury before action' and a multitude of suits to establish
a single right.
"The fact that a plaintiff or complainant might, by the insti-
other Pennsylvania cases cited ibid. 130. In these states and in others, declaratory
judgments have been rendered in numerous cases where coercive judgments might have
been sought.
14 Chick v. MacBain, 157 Va. 6o at 66, i6o S. E. 214 at 216 (x9j3). In Tolle
v. Struve, (Cal. App. 1932) 12 Pac. (2d) 61 at 62, the court answers the views of
the Michigan court in Miller v. Siden as follows:
"Appellant asserts further that, if her attempt to terminate her obligations
under the leases constituted a breach of legal duty, it was one which gave rise to a
cause of action for remedial relief against her, and, that being so, there was no
longer any room or occasion for the invocation of the statute authorizing declara-
tory relief. The statute itself seems to afford a complete answer, providing as it
does (Code Civ. Proc., sec. io6o): 'He [the plaintiff] may ask for a declaration of
rights or duties, either alone or with other relief. . . . ' (Italics ours.) We can
conceive of no meaning to be attributed to the italicized language unless the
statute contemplates the giving of declaratory relief as well after a breach of legal
duty as before. This conclusion is strengthened by the additional language of the
section that 'the court may make a binding declaration of such rights or duties,
whether or not further relief is or could be claimed at the time.' The concluding
sentence of the section further bears this out: 'Such declaration may be had before
there has been any breach of the obligation in respect to which said declaration is
sought.' (Italics ours.) The use of the word 'may' is permissive, not mandatory.
It serves to make clear what the legislature feared might otherwise be obscure, in
view of the fact that historically nearly all relief by way of judgment in common-
law courts had been limited to redress for completed wrongs, that this statute con-
templated declaratory relief, regardless of whether there had been an actual breach
of obligation or not. It does not limit the right to such relief to cases where no
breach has in fact occurred."
Cf. Oldham v. Moodie, 94. Cal. App. 88, 276 Pac. 688 (1928); Sheldon v.
Powell, 99 Fla. 782, 128 So. 258 (930); Zoercher v. Agler, 202 Ind. 214, 172 N.
E. 186 (1930); National City Bank of New York v. Waggoner, 23o App. Div. 88,
243 N. Y. S. 299 (1930).
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tution of an action or suit or series of actions or suits, eventually,
through protracted and continuous litigation, have determined the
same questions that may be determined once and for all in a de-
claratory judgment proceeding, has never, so far as we find, been
held by the courts to deprive the courts of jurisdiction to enter a
declaratory judgment wherein the entire rights of the parties can
be determined and settled once and for all. Sections 614oa-614oh
of the Code above were enacted for that evident purpose, and sec-
tion 614oh expressly declares that the act is to be liberally inter-
preted and administered "with a view to making the courts more
serviceable to the people.'"
It is true that the English courts have adopted a rule that, where a
specific statutory remedy has been provided for a given type of com-
plaint or demand, the parties should resort to that specific remedy."
Such a rule is unexceptionable. It is also true that an action for a dec-
laration must be brought in a court having jurisdiction. And as a matter
of fact a declaratory judgment may lie in certain cases, mainly those in-
volving peril and insecurity, where no other form of action would have
been possible.' 6 But in a case where several prayers for relief are possi-
ble, the court should not insist that a plaintiff adopt his most drastic and
expensive remedy when a simple, mild, and inexpensive remedy will
determine the issue and preserve his rights. The mere fact that a
common-law action of the standard type might have been brought is
no ground at all for denying a. declaration. A consistent practice of
fifty years has established this conclusion beyond the possibility of
doubt. The hope may be expressed that the Michigan court will take
an early occasion to reconsider its position in the Miller case.
11 Barraclough v. Brown, L. R. [1897] A. C. 61s at 623; Bull v. Attorney Gen-
eral of New South Wales, L. R. [1916] z A. C. 564; Grand Junction Waterworks Co.
v. Hampton U. D. C., L. R. [1898] z Ch. Div. 331; Flint v. Attorney General, L. R.
[1918 ] i Ch. Div. zx6 (i917).
'See cases discussed in my article "Judicial Relief for Peril and Insecurity," 45
H~nv. L. REv. 793 (1952).
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